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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
by Mary F. Radford*
This Article describes the significant Georgia cases and legislation
from the period of June 1, 2005 through May 31, 2006 that pertain to
Georgia fiduciary law. Specifically, the Article covers cases and
legislation on matters relating to wills, trusts, the administration of
decedents' estates, and the guardianship and conservatorship of minors
and incapacitated adults.
I.

SIGNIFICANT GEORGIA CASES

A. The Effect of a Testator's MarriageSubsequent to the Making of a
Will
Under Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 53-4-48,
as amended in 2002, a marriage subsequent to the making of a will
"shall result in a revocation of the will only to the extent provided in the
remainder of this Code section."' The section then goes on to explain
that, assuming the will was not made in contemplation of marriage, the

* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Newcomb College of
Tulane University (B.A., 1974); Emory University (J.D., 1981). Member, State Bar of
Georgia. Reporter, Probate Code Revision Committee, Guardianship Code Revision
Committee, and Trust Code Revision Committee of the Fiduciary Law Section of the State
Bar of Georgia. Academic Fellow and Member of Board of Regents, American College of
Trust & Estate Counsel. Author, REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA (6th
ed. 2000) and GUARDIANSHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHPS IN GEORGIA (2005). The Author
expresses her appreciation to Margaret Louttit for her assistance in the preparation of this
Article. The Author is also grateful to Atlanta attorney Jeffrey M. Zitron for the insight
he offered on the life insurance statutes that are discussed at the end of this Article.
1. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-48(a) (Supp. 2006) (formerly O.C.G.A. § 53-2-76 of the pre-1998
Probate Code). The 2002 amendment of this Code section is described in 1 MARY F.
RADFORD, REDFEARN: WILLS & ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 5-17, at 27-28 (6th ed. 2000)
(Supp. 2005).
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subsequent spouse is to receive the share of the decedent's estate that
he or she would have received if the decedent had died intestate.2 The
question that arose in English v. Ricart3 was whether the subsequent
spouse's right to her intestate share was one that existed automatically
by virtue of the statute or one that would be granted only if the
subsequent spouse filed a timely caveat to the will.4 The Georgia
Supreme Court gave a limited answer to this question.'
After divorcing his first wife, Mr. English executed a 1994 will leaving
his entire estate to his two sons. Mr. English married Ms. Ricart in
2001. He died in 2004 without changing his will. His executor filed a
petition to probate the will and named Ricart as one of English's heirs.
The citation included the standard language requiring any objection to
be filed within ten days of service of the petition. Ricart signed an
Acknowledgment of Service and Assent to Probate Instanter. The sons
requested a hearing to contest Ricart's status as their father's spouse.
Later, before the will was admitted to probate, Ricart filed a motion for
clarification of her status as an heir.6 She relied upon O.C.G.A. section
53-4-48.' If O.C.G.A. section 53-4-48 applied, then Ricart would have
been due one-third of English's estate under O.C.G.A. section 53-21(b)(1).' The sons, however, claimed that she had waived her right to
this statutory share when she assented to the probate, acknowledged
service, and failed to object within ten days of the service of the petition.
The sons also said that the court should have admitted the will to
probate immediately after receiving the sons' proposed order.9 The
probate court held that Ricart had a right to make a claim because the
will had not yet been admitted to probate at the time her claim was
filed.1" The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.11
The court stated that the O.C.G.A. gives the probate judge the
discretion to extend the time for filing any objections and for holding any

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
l(b)(1),
spouse
estate.
9.
10.
11.

O.C.G.A. § 53-4-48(c) (Supp. 2006).
280 Ga. 215, 626 S.E.2d 475 (2006).
Id. at 215, 626 S.E.2d at 476.
Id. at 216-17, 626 S.E.2d at 477-78.
Id. at 215, 626 S.E.2d at 476-77.
Id.; see O.C.G.A. § 53-4-48.
See O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (1997 & Supp. 2006). Under O.C.G.A. section 53-2an intestate decedent's estate is divided equally among the decedent's surviving
and children, but the surviving spouse's share is never less than one-third of the
Id.
English, 280 Ga. at 216, 626 S.E.2d at 477.
Id.
Id. at 217, 626 S.E.2d at 478.
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required hearing.1 2 Thus, the probate judge had the right to extend
Ricart's time for filing a response and had done so by not admitting the
will to probate.13 The supreme court noted that it expressly did not
reach the issue of whether Ricart could have claimed her statutory share
4
as a matter of law even after the will had been admitted to probate.1
The more interesting legal discussion in this case appears in a
concurring opinion written by Justice Carley and joined by Justice
Thompson.1 5 In his opinion, Justice Carley took his colleagues to task
for refusing to address the statutory issue.'" Justice Carley stated that
Ricart's right to take her intestate share existed as a matter of right
regardless of whether she filed a claim after the will had been admitted
to probate. 7 Citing the probate court, Justice Carley explained that
while a caveat to a will alleges facts that show why the will should not
be probated, the spouse's claim in this case was not based on disputed
facts but was one that arose by operation of law.'" Justice Carley
outlined the derivation of the rights under O.C.G.A. section 53-4-48 of
a spouse who marries a testator after the testator has made a will that
does not contemplate a subsequent marriage. 9 He noted that the pre2002 version of the statute had called for a complete revocation of the
will upon the testator's subsequent marriage if the will did not
contemplate such an event. 2' However, under the 2002 amendment,
the will would remain intact, and a limited revocation would occur only
to the extent needed to give the spouse her intestate share.2 ' Justice
Carley thus stated that the "clear and obvious intent of the General
Assembly ... was to uphold the validity of a will, and thereby dispense
with the procedural applicability of a caveat" in this type of situation.22
Using this logic, he concluded that Ricart's assent to the probate of the

12. Id. at 216,626 S.E.2d at 477. This authorization appears in O.C.G.A. section 53-115 (1997).
13. English, 280 Ga. at 217, 626 S.E.2d at 478.
14. Id. at 217 n.5, 626 S.E.2d at 478 n.5.
15. Id. at 217, 626 S.E.2d at 478 (Carley, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 217-18, 220, 626 S.E.2d at 478, 480.
17. Id. at 218, 626 S.E.2d at 478.
18. Id.
19. Id. O.C.G.A. section 53-4-48(a) (Supp. 2006) states that the provisions of that Code
section apply only if the will does not contemplate the subsequent marriage. In other
words, if the will contains language that indicates the will was made in contemplation of
a marriage by the testator, the presumption is that the testator intended that the will
remain intact as written and that the estate be distributed under the terms of the will even
if the testator later married. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-48(a).
20. English, 280 Ga. at 219, 626 S.E.2d at 479 (Carley, J., concurring).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 218, 626 S.E.2d at 478.
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will was "completely consistent with her statutory claim to an intestate

share."23 The issue of whether the spouse could take that statutory
share was not one that needed to be raised prior to probate because the
spouse retained that right as a matter of law, regardless of whether the
will had been admitted to probate.2 4
B.

Joint Wills, Mutual Wills, and Other Miscellaneous Issues
The Georgia Supreme Court addressed a variety of issues in the case
of Hodges v. Callaway.25 The testators in this case, Mr. and Mrs.
Jones, executed a will in 1974 that was called the "Mutual Last Will and
Testament of P. H. Jones and Mrs. Lucille C. Jones."" The will
provided that the survivor of the two would serve as executor of the
other's estate, would receive all personal property of the other, and
would receive a life estate in all real property with the right to sell the
property "'if necessary for their (his or her) maintenance and support,
without any limitations or restrictions.'" 27 Upon the death of the life
tenant, the remainder of the real property would be divided between the
spouses' families. When Mr. Jones died in 1986, the will was not
submitted for probate.28 At that time, however, Mrs. Jones did sign a
codicil 29 to the will to name a new executor, Linton Hodges, for her

estate. In 1999 Mrs. Jones conveyed by gift to her second cousin,
William Callaway, a tract of land that had been owned by the two
testators when Mr. Jones died. At the same time, she appointed
Callaway as her attorney-in-fact.3 0 Both the deed and the power of
attorney document were witnessed by a state court judge and a probate
court judge. 1
Mrs. Jones died in 2001, and Hodges, the executor, submitted the will
for probate. Hodges then filed an action against Callaway seeking to
void the deed of gift. Hodges claimed that the gift was null and void for
several reasons including: (1) the will precluded Mrs. Jones from making
the gift; (2) Mrs. Jones did not have the appropriate capacity to execute

23. Id.
24. Id. at 220, 626 S.E.2d at 480.
25. 279 Ga. 789, 621 S.E.2d 428 (2005).
26. Id. at 789, 621 S.E.2d at 430.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. A codicil is a formal amendment of a will. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-2(4) (1997 & Supp.
2006).
30. Hodges, 279 Ga. at 790, 621 S.E.2d at 430. An attorney-in-fact or agent is a person
who is appointed by a principal to perform acts that the principal otherwise has the power
to perform. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6-141 (2000).
31. Hodges, 279 Ga. at 790, 621 S.E.2d at 430.
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the deed of gift; (3) Callaway exercised undue influence over her; and (4)
Callaway breached his fiduciary duty as attorney-in-fact when he
accepted the gift. Callaway counterclaimed, alleging fraud and a breach
of a warranty covenant that was contained in the deed.32 He sought
compensatory and punitive damages of $1,000,000. 33 The Georgia
Supreme Court held as follows: (1) the will did not preclude Mrs. Jones
from making the gift; (2) Mrs. Jones did not lack the capacity to sign
either the deed of gift or the power of attorney document; (3) Callaway
did not breach a fiduciary duty when he accepted the gift; (4) the trial
court was not precluded from considering whether Mrs. Jones had
breached the 3warranty
of title; and (5) Mrs. Jones had in fact breached
4
the warranty.
1. The Joint Will."5 The first question raised in deciding if the
will precluded Mrs. Jones from conveying the real property was whether
the pre-1998 Probate Code (the "former Code") or the Revised Probate
Code of 1998 (the "Revised Code") applied. 6 The Georgia Supreme
Court determined that the answer would be the same under either
forward from the former Code the confusing term
version but carried
"mutual will."37 The will was definitely a "joint will," which is one
document signed by two individuals that contains the dispositions of
both of their estates.38 Under older case law, the term "mutual will"
was a term of law as well as a term of description and was used to refer
to a will that contains reciprocal provisions and an agreement that the
39
survivor is bound by contract to abide by the terms of the mutual will.
Thus, if the Joneses' will was determined to be a "mutual will" under
this old case law, Mrs. Jones was bound by contract to retain the
testamentary scheme contained in the will and thus bound not to dispose
of the property in any manner other than that set forth in the will.

32.
33.
34.

Id., 621 S.E.2d at 430-31.
Id. at 790 n.2, 621 S.E.2d at 431 n.2.
Id. at 790-95, 621 S.E.2d at 431-34.
35. See RADFORD, WILLS & ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at §§ 2-9, 5-19 for a
discussion of joint wills and mutual wills.
36. Hodges, 279 Ga. at 790, 621 S.E.2d at 431. The Georgia Probate Code (Chapters
1-11 of Title 53) was revised effective January 1, 1998. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-1 (1997 & Supp.
2006). The Revised Probate Code applies as of that date except that "no vested rights of
title, year's support, succession, or inheritance shall be impaired." Id.
37. Hodges, 279 Ga. at 790, 621 S.E.2d at 431.
38. Id. at 791-92, 621 S.E.2d at 431-32; see O.C.G.A. § 53-4-31(a) (1997).
39. Hodges, 279 Ga. at 791, 621 S.E.2d at 431 (citing Webb v. Smith, 220 Ga. 809, 81112, 141 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1965)).
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By defining both "joint" and "mutual" wills, the Revised Code
attempted to clear up some of the confusion caused by that terminology.4O Under O.C.G.A. section 53-4-31, a "joint will is one will signed by
two or more testators that deals with the distribution of the property of
each testator."41 "'Mutual wills are separate wills of two or more
testators that make reciprocal dispositions of each testator's property.'" 42 Neither term is meant to convey the legal notion that the
survivor is bound by contract to keep the testamentary scheme intact.4 3
Under the Revised Code, such contracts, if entered into on or after
January 1, 1998, must be express and in writing." The supreme court
cited all of these Revised Code sections but then persisted in using the
term "mutual will" as a legal term when it stated that "the will in issue
here is joint, but not mutual, and was revocable by Mrs. Jones .... ,"'
In any event, the court determined that the will in question did not
contain the requisite express or definite statement of a contractual
agreement, and it also did not contain "a clear and definite agreement,"
which would have allowed equity to intervene to prevent fraud. 4' Thus,
Mrs. Jones was within her rights in conveying the property to Calla47

way.

2. Deed of Gift and Power of Attorney. The Georgia Supreme
Court upheld the grant of summary judgment to Callaway on the issue
of whether Mrs. Jones was competent to give the property to him and to
appoint him as her attorney-in-fact. 4' Both of the judges who witnessed the deed and power of attorney document had given detailed
affidavits describing how they had met separately with Mrs. Jones to
satisfy themselves that she understood both the irrevocable effect of the
deed and the effect of the power of attorney.49 The only evidence
offered to refute the judges' conclusions as to her competency was an
affidavit by a niece that indicated some forgetfulness on Mrs. Jones's
part.5" The supreme court gave little weight to this evidence because
the affidavit did not offer any grounds for finding that Mrs. Jones was

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See O.C.G.A. § 53-4-31 (1997).
Hodges, 279 Ga. at 791, 621 S.E.2d at 431-32 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-4-31(a)).
Id., 621 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-4-31(b)).
Id. at 791-92, 621 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-4-32 (1997)).
Id. at 791, 621 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-4-30 (1997)).
Id. at 792, 621 S.E.2d at 432.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 793, 621 S.E.2d at 433.
Id., 621 S.E.2d at 432.
Id., 621 S.E.2d at 433.
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"non compos mentis, that is, entirely without understanding."5
Applying the competency standard for entering into a valid contract, the
supreme court held that the trial court properly granted summary
judgment to Callaway on these issues.52
3. Violation of Fiduciary Duty. In holding that Callaway had not
breached his fiduciary duty in accepting the gifts, the supreme court
cited cases that indicated that an agent under a power of attorney,
although bound by a duty of loyalty, is not precluded from accepting
transfers from the principal absent a showing of fraud.53 The court
again pointed to the judges' affidavits to show that Mrs. Jones had
executed
the deed of gift and the power of attorney freely and voluntari54
ly.
4. Breach of Covenant of Warranty of Title. Having found that
the conveyance to Callaway was proper, the court then determined
whether the trial court had properly granted summary judgment to
Callaway on the issue of breach of warranty of title.55 In the deed to
Callaway, Mrs. Jones expressly covenanted that she had a fee simple
interest in the property.5 6 At best, the trial court concluded, she only
had the one-half vested interest she had originally owned and a life
estate in the other one-half that had passed to her through her
husband's will.57 Thus, the supreme court held that she had breached
the covenant and her estate would be liable for the remaining interest
to which Callaway was entitled.55
C.

Effect of PrenuptialAgreement on Transfers at Death

Sometimes attorneys who deal with decedents' estates are faced with
the question of whether the decedent's prenuptial agreement will govern
the way in which the decedent's property will be transferred at death.
The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Hiers v. Estate of
Hiers.59 Prior to her marriage, Mindy Hiers signed a prenuptial

51. Id. (quoting Jones v. Smith, 206 Ga. 162, 165, 56 S.E.2d 462, 466 (1949)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 794, 621 S.E.2d at 433 (citing LeCraw v. LeCraw, 261 Ga. 98, 99-100, 401
S.E.2d 697, 698-99 (1991); Jordan v. Stephens, 221 Ga. App. 8, 9, 470 S.E.2d 733, 735
(1996)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 794-95, 621 S.E.2d at 433-34.
56. Id. at 795, 621 S.E.2d at 433.
57. Id. at 794-95, 621 S.E.2d at 433-34.
58. Id. at 795, 621 S.E.2d at 434.
59. 278 Ga. App. 242, 628 S.E.2d 653 (2006).
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agreement in which she agreed that she would only inherit $5000 from
the estate of her spouse-to-be. When Mr. Hiers died, Mrs. Hiers filed for
year's support. 0 The trial court granted summary judgment against
Mrs. Hiers, finding the prenuptial agreement to be valid, binding, and
enforceable, and thus precluding her from petitioning for year's
support.6 1 The court of appeals affirmed. 2
In her deposition, Mrs. Hiers stated that she knew that her husbandto-be would not marry her if she did not sign the agreement. Though
she stated that she understood the agreement's terms, she also admitted
that she had not actually read the agreement before signing it, even
though it had been offered for her perusal before she signed it. She also
apparently had not inquired into her fiance's financial condition, even
though financial statements were attached to the agreement."2 She
stated that she trusted her husband-to-be and relied upon "his promise
64
to take care of her financially, that she had 'nothing to worry about.'
She made no attempt to contest the prenuptial agreement throughout
the course of their nine-year marriage. The husband left the bulk of his
$6 million estate to his son. Mrs. Hiers received the expected $5000
from his estate and approximately $95,000 in cash from jointly-held
bank accounts.65
The Georgia Court of Appeals determined that the prenuptial
agreement met the requirements for a valid agreement set out in 1982
by the Georgia Supreme Court in Scherer v. Scherer.66 The first

60. Id. at 243-44, 628 S.E.2d at 656. The spouse and minor children of a decedent are
entitled to file to receive a year's support from the decedent's estate. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-1(c).
They are awarded whatever property they request in their petition, unless an objection to
the petition is filed. Id. § 53-3-7(a) (1997). In the case of an objection, the probate judge
will hold a hearing to determine what amount the spouse and children need
to maintain the standard of living that the surviving spouse and each minor child
had prior to the death of the decedent, taking into consideration the following:
(1) The support available to the individual for whom the property is to be set
apart from sources other than year's support, including but not limited to the
principal of any separate estate and the income and earning capacity of that
individual;
(2) The solvency of the estate; and
(3) Such other relevant criteria as the court deems equitable and proper.
Id. § 53-3-7(c). See RADFORD, WILLS & ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at § 10 for a
discussion of year's support.
61. Hiers, 278 Ga. App. at 242, 628 S.E.2d at 655.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 243, 628 S.E.2d at 655.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 244, 628 S.E.2d at 656.
66. Id. at 247, 628 S.E.2d at 658; Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662
(1982).
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requirement is that the agreement may not be obtained through fraud,
duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure of material facts.6 7
The court of appeals ruled that although the husband had demanded the
agreement as a precondition to the marriage, it did not amount to the
type of coercion that would have overcome the wife's free will.18 The
court also concluded that although the financial disclosures may have
neglected to mention a lake house that the husband may have owned,
the fact that Mrs. Hiers never even read the disclosures negated the
possibility that she would have relied on them. 9 The court further
concluded that Mr. Hiers's promise to "'take care of'" his wife did not
constitute a misrepresentation or fraud.70
The second Scherer factor is whether the agreement was unconscionable.7 ' Mrs. Hiers based her allegation of unconscionability on the
disparity between her and her husband in both their financial situations
and their business expertise and the fact that after nine years of
marriage, he had left her "no visible means of support."72 The court of
appeals pointed out that Mrs. Hiers had entered the marriage with only
$2500 and had left with over $100,000 and had been able to live in the
marital home and drive their cars for months after her husband's
death.7" The court noted that "the fact that a prenuptial agreement
perpetuates an existing disparity of wealth between the parties does not
render it unconscionable."7 4
The third and final Scherer factor, changed circumstances such that
enforcement of the agreement would be unfair and unreasonable, 5 was
not supported by any facts in the record.76 Thus, the court refused to
engage in what it referred to as a "judicial repudiation" of the prenuptial
agreement.7 7

67.
S.E.2d
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Hiers, 278 Ga. App. at 245, 628 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Scherer, 249 Ga. at 641, 292
at 666).
Id. at 245-46, 628 S.E.2d at 657.
Id. at 246, 628 S.E.2d at 657.
Id.
Id. at 245, 628 S.E.2d. at 657 (citing Scherer, 249 Ga. at 641, 292 S.E.2d at 666).
Id. at 246, 628 S.E.2d at 657-58.
Id., 628 S.E.2d at 658.
Id. at 246-47, 628 S.E.2d at 658.
Id. at 245, 628 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Scherer, 249 Ga. at 641, 292 S.E.2d at 666).
Id. at 247, 628 S.E.2d at 658.
Id.
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Lack of Testamentary Capacity & Undue Influence

When the Georgia Supreme Court reviews jury decisions that would
void a testator's will due to lack of testamentary capacity78 or undue
influence,79 it is faced with two competing interests. On the one hand
is the recognition that the right to make a will is considered to be a
"valuable right [that] was recognized in the elemental dawn of recorded
history."" ° Thus, courts should be extremely reluctant to invalidate a
testator's will. On the other hand is the recognition that a jury's verdict
should be upheld if there is any evidence to support the jury's finding.
This tension was exhibited once again in 2005 by a 4-3 decision in
Wilson v. Lane.8
In Wilson the Georgia Supreme Court reversed a jury's verdict that
the testator had lacked testamentary capacity after concluding that
there was no evidence to support the jury's verdict.8 2 The will of the
testator divided her property equally among seventeen individuals,
sixteen of whom were blood relatives. The seventeenth beneficiary had
been the testator's caretaker.8 3 The drafting attorney's testimony
indicated that the testator had "emphatically selected" all of the
beneficiaries.84 Others who knew the testator also testified that she
had been of clear mind.85 Thus, the court held that the propounders
had raised a presumption of capacity and that the caveators never
presented any evidence to rebut that presumption. 6
The caveators had shown that the testator was "eccentric, aged, and
peculiar in the last years of her life." 7 Additionally, she had a fear of
flooding, she refused to get into the bathtub, and she would not allow
visitors to run water or flush the toilets when visiting her home.
Testimony showed that she did not know which month it was, did not
know her Social Security number, could not recall the last names of
people, and called the fire department one time when there had been no

78. See RADFORD, WILLS & ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at §§ 4-2 to 4-5 for a
discussion of testamentary capacity.
79. See RADFORD, WILLS & ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at § 4-8 for a discussion of
undue influence.
80. Brumbelow v. Hopkins, 197 Ga. 247, 255, 29 S.E.2d 42, 47 (1944).
81. 279 Ga. 492, 614 S.E.2d 88 (2005).
82. Id. at 492, 614 S.E.2d at 88.
83. Id., 614 S.E.2d at 88-89.
84. Id., 614 S.E.2d at 89.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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fire.88 An expert testified based on an examination of her medical files,
not on any observation of the testator. The files showed that the
testator appeared to be suffering from some form of Alzheimer's-type
dementia.8 9 The testator's physician wrote a letter saying that she was
legally blind and suffering from "senile dementia," but the physician said
that he only wrote the letter to assist her in obtaining help with her
telephone bill.9 ° A petition to have a guardian appointed for the
testator had been filed after the will was executed, but the court
concluded that the petition had been filed to allay concerns from the
Department of Family and Children's Services about her ability to
continue living alone at home.9 The court also noted that her inability
to live alone had existed at the time the will was executed and had no
relation to whether she had testamentary capacity.92
The court
concluded that "[a]t most there was evidence that [the testator] was an
eccentric woman whose mental health declined towards the end of her
life."93 In making its ruling, the supreme court stressed that the right
to make a will is a "'valuable right."'94
Justice Carley, joined in dissent by Justices Sears and Hines, agreed
that the testimony might have authorized a finding that the testator had
the appropriate capacity but focused on the fact that a jury had found
that she did not.95 The dissenting judges believed that the totality of
the evidence supported the jury's verdict in favor of the caveators.96
The Georgia Supreme Court also reviewed two undue influence cases
in the 2005-06 reporting period. In the first of these cases, Trotman v.
97
Forester,
the supreme court held that the evidence supported the trial
court's finding of undue influence by one of the testator's sons who was
named as a beneficiary under the will.9" The court focused both on the
findings that the testator was of weakened mind and that a confidential
relationship existed between the testator and her son.9 9

88. Id. at 496-97, 614 S.E.2d at 91 (Carley, J., dissenting).
89. Wilson, 279 Ga. at 493, 614 S.E.2d at 89. Chief Justice Fletcher, writing for the
majority, noted: "Regardless of the stigma associated with the term 'Alzheimer's,' however,
that testimony does not show how Greer would have been unable to form a rational desire
regarding the disposition of her assets." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id., 614 S.E.2d at 89-90.
92. Id. at 493-94, 614 S.E.2d at 90.
93. Id. at 494, 614 S.E.2d at 90.
94. Id. (quoting Brumbelow v. Hopkins, 197 Ga. 247, 256, 29 S.E.2d 42, 48 (1944)).
95. Id. at 494, 614 S.E.2d at 90 (Carley, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 494-95, 614 S.E.2d at 90.
97. 279 Ga. 844, 621 S.E.2d 724 (2005).
98. Id. at 844, 621 S.E.2d at 725.
99. Id. at 845-47, 621 S.E.2d at 725-26.
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The court determined that there was "ample evidence" that the
testator's mental capacity was diminished at the time the will was
executed and had been for almost two years since the testator's husband
died. °0 A psychiatrist examined the testator the month after her
husband died, and a psychologist examined her three months before she
executed her will.'
Both testified that she was suffering from mild
"Alzheimer's type" dementia and that there was not much likelihood that
her condition would improve.' 2 A niece and nephew also believed that
she was suffering from Alzheimer's disease because the testator's brother
had the disease, and both observers had seen the testator in situations
in which she was extremely disoriented. The nephew told the attorney
who drafted the testator's will that he would not serve as executor
03
because he thought that his aunt was not competent to make a will.

Furthermore, the testator had employed the services of two attorneys,
one who put together her overall estate plan and a second who actually
drafted her will. The attorney who drafted her will did not believe that
the testator's son, Cliff, had unduly influenced her, even though the
attorney said that Cliff had tried to influence both the testator and that
attorney. The other attorney admitted that he had only spoken with the
testator twice, once in person and once by phone, but that he had spoken
with Cliff at least nine times without his mother being present. Cliff
participated in both of the conversations the drafting attorney had with
the testator. Many of the items that ended up in the will resembled
items that Cliff had suggested to the attorney. Other witnesses testified
that Cliff had isolated the testator from her relatives and friends after
her husband's death and had been with her constantly around the time
that the will was executed."°4 Accordingly, the court held that the
evidence supported the trial judge's finding that the testator, in her
weakened mental state, had been the victim of undue influence by
Cliff.105

The second undue influence case, Bailey v. Edmundson, °6 was a bit
unusual in that the individuals who were asserted to have exercised the

100. Id. at 845, 621 S.E.2d at 725.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 845-46, 621 S.E.2d at 726. Glenda, a niece of the testator, said that Cliff
had not isolated the testator, but other witnesses testified that Glenda "'took sides'" with
Cliff, had followed the testator whenever she was with other people, and had attended the
will execution, during which time she either stood behind or sat beside the testator. Id.
at 846, 621 S.E.2d at 726.
105. Id. at 846-47, 621 S.E.2d at 726.
106. 280 Ga. 528, 630 S.E.2d 396 (2006).
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undue influence did not take a substantial portion of the testator's estate
under the testator's new will. The testator had written a will in 2003,
which left the bulk of his estate to his daughter. Subsequently, he was
diagnosed with lung and brain cancer. Price and Palleson, whom the
testator had met at church, were hired to care for him. Also, Edmundson, who was on the staff of the church, baptized and frequently visited
the testator. In 2004 the testator executed a new will, leaving bequests
to the church, Price, Palleson, and Edmundson, and devising seventy-five
percent of the residue of his estate to his sister and the other twenty-five
percent to his daughter. Edmundson was named as successor executor
in this will.10 7
When the testator died, his daughter filed his 2003 will for probate
and Edmundson submitted the 2004 will. The daughter filed a caveat
to the 2004 will and asked for a jury trial. Her caveat was based on
several grounds, but the jury returned a verdict in her favor on the sole
ground of undue influence by Price, Palleson, and Edmundson. After the
verdict was returned, Edmundson renewed a motion for directed verdict,
which the judge granted. 10 8 The Georgia Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the evidence was sufficient to submit the issue of undue
influence to the jury.0 9
The supreme court noted that "[a] rebuttable presumption of undue
influence arises when a beneficiary under a will occupies a confidential
relationship with the testator, is not the natural object of his bounty,
and takes an active part in the planning, preparation, or execution of the
will." 1 ° The court determined that the caregivers were "actively
involved" in every aspect of the preparation and execution of the 2004
will."' The court also concluded that there was "some evidence" of a
confidential relationship." 2 Even though the attorney who prepared
the 2004 will and the two witnesses saw no sign of mental impairment,
the court cited the following evidence:
The oncologist who treated the Testator testified by deposition that his
medication could cause altered mental status and occasional psychosis.
Other testimony showed that, although Testator had a strong
personality, during the summer of 2004 he suffered from severe
physical inabilities, memory impairment, and mental confusion. The

107.
108.
109.
110.
S.E.2d
111.
112.

Id. at 528, 630 S.E.2d at 398.
Id.
Id. at 531, 630 S.E.2d at 400.
Id. at 529, 630 S.E.2d at 398 (citing McConnell v. Moore, 267 Ga. 839, 840, 483
578, 579 (1997)).
Id., 630 S.E.2d at 399.
Id. (citing Trotman, 279 Ga. at 845, 621 S.E.2d at 725).
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evidence presented by Ms. Bailey [the daughter] also showed that
Testator, in the hope of helping himself go to heaven, made gifts and
loans to Ms. Price, Palleson, and Edmundson; that Testator was
dependent on his care givers for personal and medical care; that he
was afraid that they would quit and that his daughter would put him
into a nursing home;
and, that because of them he stopped permitting
3
her to visit him."
The court also noted the "[tiestator's short-term relationship with [the
caregivers], his sporadic contact with and lack of trust towards [the
sister to whom he devised seventy-five percent of his estate], and his
long-standing expressions of testamentary intent to leave all of his
property to [his daughter], which he repeated the day after execution."" 4 The court stated that this evidence was sufficient to trigger
the presumption of undue influence." 5 The court held that even if
there had not been a confidential relationship, the evidence of undue
6
influence authorized sending the case to the jury."
E.

Equity and the Administration of Estates

The Georgia probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have
only that jurisdiction that is granted to them by law." 7 The probate
courts do not have jurisdiction in equity cases, as the Georgia Constitution reserves exclusive jurisdiction in equity cases to the superior
courts." ' Under O.C.G.A. section 23-2-91, equity will interfere in the
administration of an estate only upon application of the personal
representative 9 or "of any person interested in the estate where there
is danger of loss or other injury to his interests."2 °
In Morgan v. Johns,'2 ' the heirs of a testator sought an injunction'22 from the superior court as "person[s] interested in the es-

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 529-30, 630 S.E.2d at 399 (citation omitted).
Id. at 531, 630 S.E.2d at 400.
Id.
Id. at 530, 630 S.E.2d at 399.
GA. CONST. art. VI, § 1, para. 1; GA. CONST. art. VI, § 3, para. 1. See RADFORD,

WILLS & ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at § 6-1.
118. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, para. 1.

119. The application of the personal representative must be an application for
construction and direction or an application for marshaling the assets. O.C.G.A. § 23-291(1) (1981).
120. Id. § 23-2-91(2).
121. 276 Ga. App. 366, 623 S.E.2d 219 (2005), cert. granted, Johns v. Morgan, No.
S06G0576, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 207 (Mar. 27, 2006).
122. An injunction is an equitable remedy. O.C.G.A. section 9-5-1 provides as follows:
Equity, by a writ of injunction, may restrain proceedings in another or the same
court, a threatened or existing tort, or any other act of a private individual or
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tate."'2 3 In this case, the testator had disinherited his three children,
two daughters and a son, in favor of the caretaker, Morgan, who had
provided care for him in the three years prior to his death. Two months
before he died and one month before he executed his will, the testator
had named Morgan as his agent under a power of attorney. On the day
he died, the testator closed on a sale of real property, with Morgan's
assistance, and received a check for $734,250. According to Morgan, the
testator then endorsed the check over to her and gave it to her as a gift.
in an account in her name. The testator
She deposited it that 1afternoon
24
died two hours later.
Morgan, who was also named as sole executor, filed a petition to
probate the will. The daughters filed a caveat on the grounds of undue
influence and an objection to the naming of Morgan as executor. They
also filed a complaint in the superior court alleging fraud, conversion,
and breach of fiduciary duty and asked that the court set aside the gift
and enjoin Morgan from transferring or using the money she had
received from the testator. Morgan claimed that the daughters did not
have standing to pursue that action. The superior court denied Morgan's
motion to dismiss and granted an interlocutory injunction preventing
125
Morgan from using the proceeds of the sale, and Morgan appealed.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the daughters had no
standing to file their action in superior court while the probate
proceeding was pending. 12
The daughters had claimed that under
O.C.G.A. section 23-2-91(2), they, as persons "interest[ed] in the estate,"
were applying to the court of equity because there was a "danger of loss
or other injury to [their] interests." 2 Their claim was that they had
an "interest" in the estate until the will that excluded them was proved
to be valid. 2 The court of appeals rejected this argument and held
that the daughters had no interest in the estate "unless and until a
probate court finds the decedent's will is invalid and the decedent died
intestate."'29 The court characterized the daughters' interest as a
The court noted that the daughters'
mere "expected inheritance."'

corporation which is illegal or contrary to equity and good conscience and for
which no adequate remedy is provided at law.
O.C.G.A. § 9-5-1 (1981).
123. Morgan, 276 Ga. at 367, 623 S.E.2d at 220 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 23-2-91(2)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 369, 623 S.E.2d at 221.
127. Id. at 367, 623 S.E.2d at 220 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 23-2-91(2)).
128. Id. at 367-68, 623 S.E.2d at 220.
129. Id. at 368, 623 S.E.2d at 220.
130. Id., 623 S.E.2d at 221.
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claim of fraud did not make their case indistinguishable because a
finding of fraud, while invalidating the gift, would merely put the gift
back into the testator's estate, which was slated to go to Morgan
anyway.131

F

Breach of FiduciaryDuty
The case of Wachovia Bank v. Namik l1 2 made its third appearance
in the Georgia appellate courts in the 2005-06 reporting period. 133 A
brief review of the two previous decisions is necessary to give context to
this latest appellate decision. The background facts are as follows.
A retired Iraqi army officer, General Ali, while visiting his son in
Atlanta, deposited $2.65 million at the bank in a certificate of deposit,
which was scheduled to mature in six months. The next day, he and a
bank trust officer discussed placing this property in trust. General Ali
signed the bank's form revocable living trust agreement and then left the
bank.3 3 He returned to Iraq, and some years later his son revealed 3to5
the bank that Ali had been arrested upon his return and executed.
When the six-month certificate of deposit matured, the trust officer, Tom
Slaughter, wrote a memorandum (referred to as the "Slaughter
memorandum" by the Georgia Supreme Court) which indicated that Ali
wanted to fund the trust with the money from the matured certificate.3 6 The memorandum also indicated that Ali had mentioned
orally to the trust officer that he wanted "no market risks" and that he
would like to have the funds invested "only in U.S. Government
issues." 37 Neither of these instructions were embodied in the written
trust agreement, which authorized the trustee to "'hold, manage, invest,
and reinvest the said property in its discretion. ' 38 The agreement
131. Id. at 369, 623 S.E.2d at 221.
132. 275 Ga. App. 229, 620 S.E.2d 470 (2005), on remand from Namik v. Wachovia
Bank of Ga., 279 Ga. 250, 612 S.E.2d 270 (2005), rev'g Wachovia Bank of Ga. v. Namik, 265
Ga. App. 80, 593 S.E.2d 35 (2003).
133. The court of appeals's first decision in this case was discussed in this Author's
Article in the 2004 Mercer Law Review Annual Survey of Georgia Law. See Mary F.
Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration,56 MERCER L. REV.
457, 472-75 (2004). The Georgia Supreme Court's reversal and remand of the first court
of appeals decision was discussed in the 2005 Mercer Law Review Annual Survey of
Georgia Law. See Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and Fiduciary
Administration,57 MERCER L. REV. 403, 404-07 (2005).
134. Wachovia Bank, 265 Ga. App. at 80, 593 S.E.2d at 36-37.
135. Id. at 81, 593 S.E.2d at 37.
136. Namik, 279 Ga. at 250, 612 S.E.2d at 272.
137. Wachovia Bank, 265 Ga. App. at 81, 593 S.E.2d at 37.
138. Id. at 83, 593 S.E.2d at 38. The trust agreement also incorporated by reference
the trustee powers that appear in O.C.G.A. section 53-12-232 (1997). Id. O.C.G.A.
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directed that the funds were to be used for the benefit of the settlor
during his life and then, at his death, be paid over to the personal
representative of his estate." 9
At the time the trust was established, the bank officers made several
unsuccessful attempts to contact Ali. Not knowing for sure what Ali's
tax status was (that is, whether he was a citizen, non-resident alien,
among others), the bank invested the trust funds in tax-free municipal
bonds. When it was discovered that Ali was dead, the funds were paid
over to the bank as administrator of Ali's estate. The estate tax law and
regulations that were in effect at the time of Ali's death caused the
entire value of the trust fund to be included in his estate as U.S. situs
property, and the estate paid tax in the amount of $933,248.49.140
Ali's son, Namik, sued, claiming the bank was responsible for the fact
that the estate of his father had been subjected to those taxes.1 4 ' He
pointed out that the Internal Revenue Code lists certain types of
property that are not considered to be "situated in the United States"'
when calculating what is included in the gross estate of a non-resident
alien. 142 These types of property include proceeds of life insurance
policies and certain bank deposits and other debt obligations, including
U.S. debt obligations. 43 However, as noted by the court of appeals,prior to an amendment in 1997, this law was "obscure: it was 'not
perspicuous, not clearly expressed, vague, hard to understand."' 14 The
obscure rule that was in effect in 1990 would only have excluded from
the nonresident alien's gross estate investments in U.S. government
issues with a maturity of over 183 days. 4 5 The court of appeals
concluded that the bank could not be held liable for not knowing this
Supreme Court, on the other hand, held
obscure rule. 146 The Georgia
1 47
that the bank was liable.

section 53-12-231(a) (1997) provides that a settlor may incorporate by reference into a trust
agreement any or all of the extensive trustee powers that are listed in O.C.G.A. section 5312-232 (1997). O.C.G.A. § 53-12-231(a) (1997).
139. Wachovia Bank, 265 Ga. App. at 83, 593 S.E.2d at 38.
140. Id. at 81, 593 S.E.2d at 37.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 83, 593 S.E.2d at 38; see 26 U.S.C. §§ 871(a)(1), (h), (i); 26 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a),
(c)(9) (2000).
143. 26 U.S.C. § 2105 (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 2106 (2001).
144. Wachovia Bank, 265 Ga. App. at 84, 593 S.E.2d at 39 (quoting BLAcK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 971 (5th ed. 1979)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 83-84, 593 S.E.2d at 38-39.
147. Namik, 279 Ga. at 253, 612 S.E.2d at 274.
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The key factor that differentiated the court of appeals decision in the
bank's favor from the supreme court's holding against the bank was the
admissibility of the Slaughter memorandum as evidence of the settlor's
intent. 148 If the memorandum was admissible and thus incorporated
into the trust agreement, then the theory was that the bank should have
followed Ali's instructions to invest only in "U.S. Government issues." 49 Originally, the court of appeals ruled that the Slaughter
memorandum was admissible for the purpose of showing how the trust
was to be funded but inadmissible for the purpose of showing Ali's intent
as to the investment of the funds.'
The supreme court held that the
Slaughter memorandum was admissible to explain General Ali's
investment desires because it had been admitted to show the source of
the trust funds, which indicated that the written trust agreement did
not constitute the entire agreement between Ali and the bank. 5 ' The
supreme court reinstated the trial court's findings that the bank had
violated its fiduciary duty and was in breach of contract and remanded
the case to the court of appeals for review of the question of damag1 52
es.
On remand, the court of appeals, in light of the supreme court's
decision, examined whether Namik should have been awarded damages
in an amount greater than the $1,118,710 that had been awarded at
trial. '
The court of appeals determined that the damages awarded
at the trial level were appropriate after considering several issues."
First, Namik reasserted that the bank should have invested all of his
father's funds in long-term government securities-that is, securities
with maturity over 183 days. Namik argued that had the bank done so,
all estate taxes would have been avoided because all of these investments would have been considered non-U.S. situs assets for estate tax

148. See id. at 251-53, 612 S.E.2d at 272-74.
149. Wachovia Bank, 265 Ga. App. at 84, 593 S.E.2d at 39. The court of appeals noted
that even if the bank had invested in U.S. government securities, there was still no
evidence that the bank would have chosen to invest in securities with a maturity of over
183 days. Id.
150. Id. at 85-86, 593 S.E.2d at 40.
151. Namik, 279 Ga. at 252, 612 S.E.2d at 273. The Georgia Supreme Court also held
that it was inappropriate for the court of appeals to conclude that the Slaughter
memorandum was inadmissible on the basis that it represented an agreement arrived at
subsequent to the writing. Id. The supreme court held that the memorandum and the
agreement were contemporaneous. Id.
152. Id. at 253, 612 S.E.2d at 274. The court of appeals had not addressed the
damages issue because it concluded that there was no breach of fiduciary or contractual
duty by the Bank. Id.
153. Wachovia Bank, 275 Ga. App. at 229-30, 620 S.E.2d at 472.
154. Id. at 230-35, 620 S.E.2d at 472-75.
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purposes. 5 The court of appeals refused to accept this argument and
reiterated the trial court's findings that the bank was liable only for onehalf of the estate taxes incurred. 1 56 The court of appeals supported the
trial court's determination that (1) due to legitimate liquidity concerns,
the bank never would have invested all of the trust funds in long-term
treasury bills, even if it had been aware of the IRS regulation and (2)
the IRS had not issued its later-released Technical Advice Memorandum
clarifying the 183-day rule until after 1989, the year General Ali
died." '
Second, Namik also challenged the trial court's finding that he, as the
beneficiary, had a duty to mitigate the damages that resulted from the
bank's breach of fiduciary duty and contract.'58 The court of appeals
agreed with the trial court that Namik had failed in his duty to mitigate
damages by (1) delaying to report his father's death to the bank for two
years, and (2) failing to follow the bank's advice to probate his father's
will in a timely manner.'59 These delays had, among other things,
caused the estate to incur an additional $500,000 in interest for overdue
estate taxes. 16°
As to the action for breach of fiduciary duty, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's statement that, in Georgia, such actions lie in
tort and thus carry with them the requirement for mitigating damages
unless the tort is "'positive and continuous."" 6' The court of appeals
agreed with the trial court that the bank's breach was not a "positive"
tort because it was not fraud, an ongoing violation of property rights, or
an intentional tort.' 62 In addition, Georgia courts have held that the
duty to mitigate applies even in the case of "reckless" acts. 3
As to the action for breach of contract, the court of appeals noted that
Georgia statutory and case law require the injured party to mitigate
The three
damages by the use of "'ordinary care and diligence.'"'1'
exceptions to this requirement are: (1) fraud; (2) breach of an express
warranty; and (3) an "'absolute promise to pay.' 1 6 5 Again, the court

155. Id. at 230, 620 S.E.2d at 472.
156. Id. at 230-31, 620 S.E.2d at 472-73.
157. Id., 620 S.E.2d at 472.
158. Id. at 231, 620 S.E.2d at 473.
159. Id. The will was not actually probated until 1996. Id.
160. Id. at 231-32, 620 S.E.2d at 473.
161. Id. at 232, 620 S.E.2d at 473 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-12-11 (2000)).
162. Id., 620 S.E.2d at 474.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 233, 620 S.E.2d at 474 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-6-5 (2003 & Supp. 2005)).
165. Id. (quoting J.C. Penny Cas. Ins. Co. v. Woodard, 190 Ga. App. 727, 729, 380
S.E.2d 282, 284 (1989)).

442

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

noted that Namik met none of the three exceptions to the duty to
mitigate damages in contract claims.'6
Finally, Namik challenged the trial court's failure to award him
attorney fees and to require the bank to disgorge all of the trustee fees
it had earned.167 The court of appeals discussed the fees issue even
though it determined that Namik had abandoned the issue by failing to
provide any argument or authority for his theory in his enumerations of
error.'6 The court tied this issue back to the finding that the bank
'
had breached its duty only as to one-half of the trust assets. 69
The
court noted that a trial court may award either full compensation or any
reduced level of compensation for a breach of fiduciary duty and
concluded that the trial court had properly exercised its discretion." °
As to the attorney fees, the court disagreed that a breach of fiduciary
duty was synonymous with the type of "bad faith" that merits an award
of attorney fees. 7 ' The court agreed with the trial court's finding that
the bank "'did not act in bad faith, was not stubbornly litigious, and did
not cause Plaintiff's unnecessary trouble and expense."" 2 The court
of appeals also noted that O.C.G.A. section 53-12-193 does not mandate
an award of attorney fees when a fiduciary duty is breached but merely
lists it as one possible remedy.'73
In addition to the question of the sufficiency of the damages, on
remand, Namik asked the court of appeals to reexamine the trial court's
finding that in Georgia no cause of action exists in tort for a bank's
failure to follow a customer's instructions. 174 In support of his position,
Namik cited Wachovia Bank of Georgia v. Reynolds.'7 5 The court of
appeals agreed with the trial court that the facts and issues in Reynolds
were distinguishable from those in 1the
instant case and thus did not give
76
rise to such a tort cause of action.

166.
167.

Id.
Id. The trial court had required a disgorgement of only one-half of the trustee fees.

Id.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 233-34, 620 S.E.2d at 474.
Id. at 234, 620 S.E.2d at 474-75.
Id., 620 S.E.2d at 475.
Id. at 234-35, 620 S.E.2d at 475.
Id.
Id. at 235, 620 S.E.2d at 475 (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-12-193 (1997 & Supp. 2006)).
Id.
Id.; Wachovia Bank of Ga. v. Reynolds, 244 Ga. App. 1, 533 S.E.2d 743 (2000).
Wachovia Bank, 275 Ga. App. at 235, 620 S.E.2d at 475.
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Guardianship"Technical Corrections"Bill

The Revised Guardianship and Conservatorship Code of 2005 (the
"Revised Guardianship Code") 77 was enacted by the Georgia General
Assembly in 2004 and became effective July 1, 2005.178 The 2006
legislation 179 is designed primarily to correct typographical and similar
errors to the Revised Guardianship Code. The proposed legislation also
includes substantive amendments to the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") that relate to guardianship law. The substantive
amendments are as follows.
1. Change of Terminology. The Revised Guardianship Code
changed the terminology used to describe those who are appointed to
serve as guardians of a minor's or an adult's person or property. The
person who was formerly referred to as the "guardian of the person" is
referred to in the Revised Guardianship Code simply as the "guardian."'
The person who was formerly referred to as the "guardian of
the property" is now referred to as the "conservator." 8 ' The 2006
legislation extended the use of this new terminology to other sections of
the O.C.G.A. that used the old terminology. Specifically, the language
of the statutes in Title 10 that relate to financial powers of attorney
were revised to change the term "guardian" to "conservator."1 2 Also,
O.C.G.A. section 53-12-173(b), 83 which formerly described the compensation paid to trustees as equivalent to that paid to "guardians,"'84 was
changed to reflect 18that
a trustee's compensation is the same as that paid
5
to "conservators.',
2. Place of Filing Petition for Temporary Guardianship. The
Revised Guardianship Code includes provisions that allow an individual

177. O.C.G.A. §§ 29-1-1 to 29-10-11 (1997 & Supp. 2006).
178. Id. The new Code was summarized in Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts,
Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration, 56 MERCER L. REV. 457,477-78 (2004). The
Revised Code is discussed in depth in MARY F. RADFORD, GUARDLANSHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS IN GEORGIA (2005).

179.
180.

Ga. S.B. 534, Reg. Sess. (2006).
Id. (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 29-1-1 to 29-10-11).

181.

Id.; see RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIPS & CONSERVATORSHIPS, supra note 178, at § 1-2.

182. Ga. S.B. 534, §§ 1, 2 (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 10-6-4, 10-6-30 (2000 & Supp. 2006)).
183. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-173(b) (1997).
184. Id.
185. Ga. S.B. 534, § 23 (amending O.C.G.A. § 53-12-173(b)).
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to petition to serve as the "temporary guardian" of a minor when the
minor's parents cannot serve in the role.186 The Revised Guardianship
Code provided that the petition would be filed in the county in which the
petitioner is domiciled.'87 In recognition of the fact that some of these
petitioners may not be domiciled in Georgia, the 2006 amendment adds
that if the petitioner is not domiciled in Georgia, the petition may be
88
filed "in the probate court of the county where the minor is found."
3. Conservator as Administrator of Ward's Estate. The Georgia
Probate Code. 9 (the "Probate Code") does not mandate a list of those
persons who shall serve as the administrator of the estate of an
individual who dies intestate. Instead, the Probate Code gives the
probate court the authority to choose from a suggested group of persons
the person who will best serve the interest of the estate. 190 However,
the 2006 legislation does add one mandate for the choice of administrator.' 9' This mandate applies when a minor or ward who was under a
conservatorship dies intestate, and the conservator who had been
appointed for the decedent was the "county administrator" or "county
guardian." 92 In that situation, the 2006 amendment provides that the
conservator of the deceased minor or ward shall administer that minor's
or ward's estate, or, as stated in the statute, the conservator shall
"proceed to distribute the minor ward's [or adult ward's] estate in the
same manner as if the conservator had been appointed administrator of
the estate."'93 In addition, the 2006 amendment states: "The sureties
on the conservator's bond shall be responsible for the conservator's
faithful administration and distribution of the estate." 94

186. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-5 (Supp. 2006). See RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIPS & CONSERVATORSHIPS, supra note 178, at § 2-4 for a discussion of temporary guardians.
187. O.C.G.A. § 29-2-5(b).
188. Ga. S.B. 534, § 3 (amending O.C.G.A. § 29-2-5).
189. O.C.G.A. §§ 53-1-1 to 53-11-11 (Supp. 2006).
190. Id. § 53-6-20 (1997 & Supp. 2006). This Code section also allows the heirs of the
intestate decedent to choose the administrator by unanimous consent. Id.
191. Ga. S.B. 534, §§ 9, 15 (amending O.C.G.A. § 29-3-71 (Supp. 2006) and O.C.G.A.
§ 29-5-72 (Supp. 2006)).
192. Id. "County administrators" and "county guardians" are individuals who are
appointed in each county by the probate court to protect the property of wards and to
represent decedents' estates when no other appropriate person is available to do so.
RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIPS & CONSERVATORSHIPS, supra note 178, at § 8.
193. Ga. S.B. 534, §§ 9, 15.
194. Id. See RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIPS & CONSERVATORSHIPS, supra note 178, at §§ 35. 5-8 for a discussion of conservator's bonds.
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4. Expenses of Hearing. Neither the Revised Guardianship Code
nor the former code allowed a guardian or conservator to be appointed
for an adult unless there has been a hearing in which it has been
determined that the adult is in need of a guardian or conservator.'9 5
The 2006 amendment adds provisions that direct who will pay the
expenses of any such hearing. The 2006 amendment concerning
guardianships provides:
The amounts actually necessary or requisite to defray the expenses of
any hearing held under this article shall be paid:
(1) From the estate of the ward if a guardianship is ordered;
(2) By the petitioner if no guardianship is ordered; or
(3) By the county in which the proposed ward is domiciled or by the
county in which the hearing was held only if the person who actually
presided over the hearing executes an affidavit or includes a statement
in the order that the party against whom costs are cast pursuant to
paragraph (1) or (2) of this Code section appears to lack sufficient
assets to defray the expenses.'96
The 2006 amendment concerning conservatorships provides:
The amounts actually necessary or requisite to defray the expenses of
any hearing held under this article shall be paid:
(1) From the estate of the ward if a conservatorship is ordered;
(2) By the petitioner if no conservatorship is ordered; or
(3) By the county in which the proposed ward is domiciled or by the
county in which the hearing is held if the proposed ward is not a
domiciliary of the state. The amounts shall be paid by the appropriate
county upon the warrant of the court of the county where the hearing
was held. Payment by the county shall be required, however, only if
the person who actually presides over the hearing executes an affidavit
or includes a statement in the order that the party against whom costs
are cast pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this Code section appears
to lack sufficient assets to defray the expenses.'97
5. Judges as Custodians of Funds.
section 29-8-1:

Under the former O.C.G.A.

(a) The judges of the probate courts are, in their discretion, made the
legal custodians and distributors of all moneys due and owing to any
minor or incapacitated adult who has no legal and qualified guardian
of the property ....

195. O.C.G.A. §§ 29-4-12, 29-5-12 (2003 & Supp. 2006).
196. Ga. S.B. 534, § 11 (amending O.C.G.A. § 29-4-17 (2003 & Supp. 2006)).
197. Id. § 14 (amending O.C.G.A. § 29-5-17 (Supp. 2006)).
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(b) The judges, in their discretion, shall also be the depositories for
and custodians of all moneys of any heir of any estate who cannot be
located by the executor or administrator .... 198
The 2005 Revised Guardianship Code capped the amount that a
probate judge could hold for such minor or adult ward at $2500."9
The 2006 amendment raised the cap on the amount of funds that a
probate judge can hold as custodian for minors and incapacitated adults
who have no conservator to $15,000.200
Also, the 2006 amendment
added a provision to Title 53 of the Probate Code allowing probate
judges to serve as custodians for sums in unlimited amounts for missing
heirs or will beneficiaries.2 °1
6. Bond of Public Guardians. The Revised Guardianship Code
allowed a probate judge to appoint a "public guardian" to serve as the
guardian of an adult for whom no one else is available to serve as
guardian." 2 The public guardianship legislation requires the public
guardian to give bond of at least $10,000.203 The final sentence of this
statute, O.C.G.A. section 29-10-5, also allowed "any person aggrieved by
the misconduct of the public guardian" to bring an action on the public
guardian's bond.20 4
The 2006 legislation repealed this final sentence.2 o5
B.

Life Insurance

The Georgia General Assembly enacted two sets of statutes related to
life insurance in the 2006 session.
Life insurance is a common
component of many clients' overall estate and financial plans, and thus
these new laws are relevant to anyone who practices in the area of
estate planning.
The first bill, H.B. 1484,206 was a response to questions raised by a
federal district court in a case that was decided in 2005. The case,

198. O.C.G.A. § 29-8-1 (2003) (amended 2005 & 2006).
199. 1987 Ga. Laws 979. See RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIPS & CONSERVATORSHIPS, supra
note 178, at § 6 for a discussion of judges as custodians of funds.
200. Ga. S.B. 534, § 16 (amending O.C.G.A. § 29-6-1 (2003 & Supp. 2006)).
201. Id. § 22 (enacting new O.C.G.A. § 53-9-8 (Supp. 2006)).
202. O.C.G.A. § 29-10-1 (Supp. 2006). See RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIPS & CONSERVATORSHIPS, supra note 178, at § 10 for a discussion of public guardians.
203. O.C.G.A. § 29-10-5 (Supp. 2006).
204. 2005 Ga. Laws 509.
205. Ga. S.B. 534, § 21 (amending O.C.G.A. § 29-10-5 (Supp. 2006)).
206. Ga. H.B. 1484, Reg. Sess. (2006) (amending O.C.G.A. § 33-24-3 (2005 & Supp.
2006)).
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Chawla ex rel. Giesinger v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance
Co.,207 involved a life insurance trust's ownership of a life insurance
policy for Mr. Giesinger. 20 8 The trust originally purchased a policy
with a face value of $1 million. The policy was later increased to a face
value of $2.45 million. At the time the policy was originally issued and
when it was re-issued, the insured signed statements to the effect that
he had undergone physical examinations and was basically in good
health." 9 After the insured died, it was discovered that prior to the
issuance of the policy he had undergone brain surgery, from which
various complications had ensued. It was also discovered the insured
had been suffering from the effects of chronic alcohol poisoning. When
the insured died, the insurance company refused to pay out the policy
proceeds on the ground that the insured had misrepresented his medical
condition.210 The federal district court upheld the defendant insurance
company's denial of the claim.2"
The court based its decision not only on the ground that the insured
had lied to the insurance company, but also on the fact that the trust
had no insurable interest in the life of the insured.2 12 The district
court focused on the fact that the trust had no interest in the continued
life of the insured because, in fact, "the Trust promised to gain more
assets upon the decedent's death, i.e. death benefits under the policy,
than it would have in the event that decedent had lived. Further, the
Trust suffered no detriment, pecuniary or otherwise, upon the death of
the decedent." 21 3 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's finding that the insurance company would not be required

207. No. 03-CV-1215, 2005 WL 405405 (E.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2005).
208. Id. at *1. A life insurance trust is designed to receive the proceeds payable on a
life insurance policy when the insured dies and then distribute those proceeds in
accordance with the terms of the trust. The trust will often be listed as the owner of the
life insurance policy, by reason of the fact that the settlor of the trust transferred a policy
she already owned to the trust or the fact that the trustee purchased the policy for the
trust with assets that were transferred to the trust by the settlor. This type of trust will
often be established as an:
irrevocable insurance trust-funded or unfunded-established during the life of
the insured in such a way as to shift the income tax burden, which may accrue by
virtue of the insurance trust. This trust also takes advantage of annual gift tax
exclusions and insures that the life insurance policy is not included in the
insured's estate at the time of the death.
GEORGE M. TURNER, IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS § 18.1 (3d ed. 2005).

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Chawla, 2005 WL 405405, at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *3, *6.
Id. at *7.
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to pay the claim, but the court did not reach the insurable interest issue
because it found ample ground for upholding the lower court on the basis
of the insured's misrepresentation.2 14
In 2006 the Georgia General Assembly codified the concept that a life
215
insurance trust has an insurable interest in the settlor of the trust.
In fact, the legislature went further and provided:
The trustee of a trust has the same insurable interest in the life of any
other individual as does any beneficiary of the trust with respect to
proceeds of insurance on the life of such individual or any portion of
such proceeds that are allocable to such beneficiary's interest in such
trust. If multiple beneficiaries of a trust have an insurable interest in
the life of the same individual, the trustee of such trust has the same
aggregate insurable interest in such individual's life as such beneficiaries with respect to proceeds of insurance on the life of such individual
or any portion of such proceeds that is 216
allocable in the aggregate to
such beneficiaries' interest in the trust.
The General Assembly also clarified the following with respect to
corporations:
A corporation, foreign or domestic, has an insurable interest in the life
of any individual:
(1) Holding at least 10 percent of the issued and outstanding shares
of such corporation; or
(2) In whom the shareholders holding a majority of the issued and
outstanding shares have an insurable interest, whether arising out of
their status
as shareholders of the corporation or
217
otherwise.

Finally, the General Assembly provided that a shareholder in a
corporation has an insurable interest in the life of any other shareholder
if, pursuant to an arrangement among them, the shareholders are bound
to purchase the shares of a deceased or disabled shareholder.1 8
The second set of 2006 statutes that relate to life insurance 21 9 are

214. Chawla ex rel. Giesinger v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 440 F.3d 639,
648 (4th Cir. 2006).
215. Ga. H.B. 1484 § 1.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. This type of arrangement, sometimes referred to as a "buy-sell agreement,"
is common among shareholders in a closely held corporation who want to ensure that the
corporation remains in the hands of the original shareholders. See 1 FREDERICK K. HOOPS
ET AL., FAMILY EsTATE PLANNING GUIDE § 2:7 (4th ed. 1995).

219. The Author is grateful to Atlanta attorney Jeffrey M. Zitron for the numerous
insights he offered as to the enactment of this set of statutes. Many of those insights are
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statutes that protect the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy
from the reach of the creditors of the insured220 and the proceeds of
annuity, reversionary annuity, and pure endowment contracts from the
reach of the creditors of the person who is a beneficiary of the contract.22 ' Neither of these protections apply if the insurance policy or
annuity contract was purchased with intent to defraud creditors.2 22
These new statutes introduce a significant asset protection mechanism
for Georgia citizens and residents. 223 The state of Florida has a
similar protection.22 4 A recent Florida case, Faro v. Porchester Holdings, Inc. ,225 reflects the extent to which this exemption will reach. In
Faro an insured withdrew $30,000 of the cash surrender value of two life
insurance policies he owned and deposited those funds in a certificate of
deposit. 226 The insured's creditor tried to garnish the funds in the
bank account, but the court held that the funds could not be reached
because Florida's statute, which uses the same words as the Georgia
statute, exempted
the cash value of a life insurance policy "'upon
227
whatever form.'"

incorporated into this description of the statutes.
220. Ga. H.B. 1304, § 1,Reg. Sess. (2006) (amending O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(2005 & Supp.
2006)). It is unclear whether this new section adds more protection than existed under the
former section or merely adopts clarifying language. In Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v.
NationalLife InsuranceCo., the Georgia Supreme Court held that the cash surrender value
and cash loan value of a life insurance policy could not be garnished by the creditors of the
insured. 161 Ga. 793, 797, 131 S.E. 902, 903-04 (1926). Under Georgia bankruptcy law,
the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy is exempted from bankruptcy, but only
to the extent of $2000. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(9) (2002).
221. Ga. H.B. 1304, § 2 (amending O.C.G.A. § 33-28-7 (2005 & Supp. 2006)). The new
law does not seem to exempt an annuity from the creditors of the owner of the annuity,
although the owner is often a beneficiary under an annuity contract. Georgia bankruptcy
law exempts the debtor's right to receive "[a] payment under a pension, annuity, or similar
plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor."
O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E). Both new statutes protect against the "attachment,
garnishment, or legal process in favor of any creditor." Ga. H.B. 1304 §§ 1, 2.
222. Ga. H.B. 1304, §§1, 2.
223. The protection applies only if the policy or annuity contract is purchased by a
Georgia citizen or resident. Id.
224. FLA. STAT. § 222.14 (2004).
225. 792 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
226. Id. at 1262.
227. Id. at 1262-63, 1264 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 222.14).
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C. Medicaid Estate Recovery
228
In 1993, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,

Congress required states to develop and implement a Medicaid "estate
recovery program."22 9 The purpose of such a program is to recover
from the estate of a decedent the amount of Medicaid assistance that the
decedent received during life for nursing home or other long-term care,
such as home or community-based services. As a result of this mandate,
the Georgia legislature enacted O.C.G.A. section 49-4-147.1, which
authorized the Department of Human Resources to engage in Medicaid
230 This statute contained no details about the estate
estate recovery.
recovery system, and Georgia did not finalize regulations that implemented estate recovery until 2004.231 Among other things, the
regulations stated that estate recovery would not proceed against an
estate of $25,000 or less.232
In 2006 the Georgia General Assembly replaced O.C.G.A. section 49-4147.1 in its entirety with a new statute that relaxed some of the
restrictions that were set forth in the regulations. 233 Most importantly, the new law raises the value of estates that are exempt from
Medicaid estate recovery to $100,000 "to prevent substantial and
unreasonable hardship." 23' This amount will be adjusted annually
based on changes in the consumer price index.23 5 In addition, the new
statute provides that recovery will not be allowed unless the recipient of
the Medicaid assistance received notice of the potential for estate
recovery at the time the recipient applied for the assistance and signed
a written acknowledgment of the requisite notice. 23" The new statute
also provides that the estate recovery rules will not apply to the estate
of anyone who received Medicaid assistance prior to the effective date of
the new statute.2 7 Finally, the new statute allows for delay of

228. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13612, 107 Stat.
39 6
p).
312, 627-28 (1993) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1
229. Id.
230. O.C.G.A. § 49-4-147.1 (2006) (amended 2006).
231. The Regulations can be found at the Georgia Department of Community Health
website: http://www.communityhealth.state.ga.u/.
232. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 111B3-8-.02(4) (2004).
233. Ga. S.B. 572, § 3, Reg. Sess. (2006) (amending O.C.G.A. § 49-4-147.1).
234. Id.
235. Id. The statute also provides that "[t]he value of the estate shall not include
year's support, funeral expenses not to exceed $5,000.00, necessary expenses of
administration, or reasonable expenses of the recipient's last illness." Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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enforcement of the recovery against the decedent's estate when the heirs
or dependants of the decedent agree to repay the recovery amount in
reasonable installments." 8

238.

Id.

